Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights
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One of the inefficiencies described are the grandfather rights airspace users are able to obtain within the slot allocation system. This inefficiency is also related to the lack of clarity regarding to slot ownership. Free slots are public entities in possession of the airport coordinator. Allocated slots are still. Well as general aviation). The primary allocation5 of the slots is made by the slot coordinator, subject to historical precedence –so-called grandfather rights- and retimings of historical slots for operational reasons. Obviously, the allocation in this system is dominated by the grandfather. The current ‘grandfathering’ rule under the administrative system gives airlines an indefinite right to a slot, as long as they use it at least 80% of the time – the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule. Reallocation of airport slots based on historical precedence, i.e. Its usage of the same slots during the previous season. The entitlement to such “grandfather rights” in the context of slot allocation is familiar and uncontroversial. However, the point raised for the court in this case was a novel.
*Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Activist
*Airport Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights
*Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Legislation
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing slot-use ratio is less than one.
*Record URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V99-4WB3768-2/2/dd587b709589155a394b5698921ce51c
*Availability:
*Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
*Supplemental Notes:
*Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
*Authors:
*Sieg, Gernot
*Publication Date: 2010-1Language
*EnglishMedia Info
*Media Type: Print
*Features: References;
*Pagination: pp 29-37
*Serial:
*Volume: 44
*Issue Number: 1
*Publisher: Elsevier
*ISSN: 0191-2615
*Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615Subject/Index Terms
*TRT Terms: Airlines; Airports; Markets; Profits; Slot allocation
*Identifier Terms: European Union
*Uncontrolled Terms: Grandfather rights
*Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Aviation; Terminals and Facilities; Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights ActivistFiling Info
*Accession Number: 01146554
*Record Type: Publication
*Files: TRIS
*Created Date: Dec 15 2009 1:53PM
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing slot-use ratio is less than one.
*Record URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V99-4WB3768-2/2/dd587b709589155a394b5698921ce51c
*Availability:
*Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
*Supplemental Notes:
*Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
*Authors:
*Sieg, Gernot
*Publication Date: 2010-1Language
*EnglishMedia Info
*Media Type: Print
*Features: References;
*Pagination: pp 29-37
*Serial:
*Volume: 44
*Issue Number: 1
*Publisher: Elsevier
*ISSN: 0191-2615
*Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615Subject/Index Terms
*TRT Terms: Airlines; Airports; Markets; Profits; Slot allocation
*Identifier Terms: European Union
*Uncontrolled Terms: Grandfather rights
*Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Aviation; Terminals and Facilities; Airport Slot Allocation Grandfather RightsFiling Info Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Legislation
*Accession Number: 01146554
*Record Type: Publication
*Files: TRIS
*Created Date: Dec 15 2009 1:53PM
Register here: http://gg.gg/xhgrc
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One of the inefficiencies described are the grandfather rights airspace users are able to obtain within the slot allocation system. This inefficiency is also related to the lack of clarity regarding to slot ownership. Free slots are public entities in possession of the airport coordinator. Allocated slots are still. Well as general aviation). The primary allocation5 of the slots is made by the slot coordinator, subject to historical precedence –so-called grandfather rights- and retimings of historical slots for operational reasons. Obviously, the allocation in this system is dominated by the grandfather. The current ‘grandfathering’ rule under the administrative system gives airlines an indefinite right to a slot, as long as they use it at least 80% of the time – the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule. Reallocation of airport slots based on historical precedence, i.e. Its usage of the same slots during the previous season. The entitlement to such “grandfather rights” in the context of slot allocation is familiar and uncontroversial. However, the point raised for the court in this case was a novel.
*Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Activist
*Airport Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights
*Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Legislation
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing slot-use ratio is less than one.
*Record URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V99-4WB3768-2/2/dd587b709589155a394b5698921ce51c
*Availability:
*Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
*Supplemental Notes:
*Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
*Authors:
*Sieg, Gernot
*Publication Date: 2010-1Language
*EnglishMedia Info
*Media Type: Print
*Features: References;
*Pagination: pp 29-37
*Serial:
*Volume: 44
*Issue Number: 1
*Publisher: Elsevier
*ISSN: 0191-2615
*Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615Subject/Index Terms
*TRT Terms: Airlines; Airports; Markets; Profits; Slot allocation
*Identifier Terms: European Union
*Uncontrolled Terms: Grandfather rights
*Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Aviation; Terminals and Facilities; Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights ActivistFiling Info
*Accession Number: 01146554
*Record Type: Publication
*Files: TRIS
*Created Date: Dec 15 2009 1:53PM
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing slot-use ratio is less than one.
*Record URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V99-4WB3768-2/2/dd587b709589155a394b5698921ce51c
*Availability:
*Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
*Supplemental Notes:
*Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
*Authors:
*Sieg, Gernot
*Publication Date: 2010-1Language
*EnglishMedia Info
*Media Type: Print
*Features: References;
*Pagination: pp 29-37
*Serial:
*Volume: 44
*Issue Number: 1
*Publisher: Elsevier
*ISSN: 0191-2615
*Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615Subject/Index Terms
*TRT Terms: Airlines; Airports; Markets; Profits; Slot allocation
*Identifier Terms: European Union
*Uncontrolled Terms: Grandfather rights
*Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Aviation; Terminals and Facilities; Airport Slot Allocation Grandfather RightsFiling Info Slot Allocation Grandfather Rights Legislation
*Accession Number: 01146554
*Record Type: Publication
*Files: TRIS
*Created Date: Dec 15 2009 1:53PM
Register here: http://gg.gg/xhgrc
https://diarynote-jp.indered.space
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